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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In this Brief, the Appellants will be referred to as 
"Plaintiffs". The Defendants can be classified into two (2) 
groups* The Defendants Fred Hunsaker and Brian Chadaz are 
employees of Defendant First Federal Savings & Loan Association of 
Logan ("First Federal"), and the Defendant Brad H. Bearnson is the 
Trustee in the Trust Deed out of which this litigation arises. 
These four (4) Defendants, First Federal Savings & Loan Association 
of Logan, Fred Hunsaker, Brian Chadaz and Brad H. Bearnson, will 
be referred to collectively as the "First Federal Defendants". N. 
George Daines was legal counsel for Defendants Norman Barber and 
Helen Barber who acquired from First Federal Savings & Loan 
Association of Logan the beneficial interest in the Trust Deed 
above referenced. These three (3) Defendants, N. George Daines, 
Norman Barber and Helen Barber, will be referred to collectively 
as the "Barber Defendants". This matter was before the Trial Court 
on a Motion by the First Federal Defendants, joined in by the 
Barber Defendants, to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to 
prosecute their claim. The Trial Court ruled upon said Motion 
based upon the briefs submitted by counsel. For this reason, there 
was no hearing or evidence and hence no transcript of any 
proceedings. The record on appeal consists entirely of the records 
in the office of the Court Clerk and this record will be referred 
to in this Brief by the designation "R" followed by the appropriate 
page reference. Attached as addenda to this Brief are copies of 
the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision dated January 19, 1989 
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granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Trial Court's Findings 
of Fact and Order dated January 21, 1989 dismissing Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision dated February 27, 
1989, denying Plaintiffs' Motion For a New Trial, and the Trial 
Court's formal Order Denying New Trial dated March 14, 1989. The 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure will be referred to as "URCP". All 
emphasis is added. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
under U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(j), being a case transferred to the Court 
of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case is an appeal from a Decision and Order of the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen in the District Court of Cache 
County, Utah entered January 27, 1989, dismissing Plaintiffs' 
Complaint under Rule 41(b) of the URCP for failure to prosecute. 
Following the entry of Judge Christoffersen's Order of Dismissal 
with Prejudice of January 27, 1989, Plaintiffs filed a Motion For 
a New Trial. This Motion was denied by the Trial Court by 
Memorandum Decision dated February 27, 1989 and by a formal Order 
Denying New Trial dated March 14, 1989. This appeal is taken by 
the Plaintiffs from the Order of Dismissal and the Order Denying 
a New Trial. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE? 
2. WAS THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS A 
HEARING ON THE MOTION OF THE FIRST FEDERAL DEFENDANTS TO DISMISS 
FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL. STATUTORY RULES 
The following are determinative Rules that support the relief 
the First Federal Defendants seek: 
1. Rule 41(b) URCP: 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute *.. 
a defendant may move for dismissal of an action 
or any claims against him. . . . Unless the 
court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision 
and any dismissal not provided for in this 
rule, other than a dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack 
of an indispensable party, operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits. 
2. Rule 4-501(9), Code of Judicial Administration: 
In cases where the granting of a motion would 
dispose of the action or any issues thereon on 
the merits with prejudice, the party resisting 
the motion may request a hearing and such 
request shall be granted. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs filed this action on November 3, 1983 and amended 
their Complaint on November 28, 1983. As amended, the Complaint 
alleges four (4) causes of action seeking damages from alleged 
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wrongful conduct by the First Federal Defendants in foreclosing a 
Trust Deed given by Plaintiffs as Trustors to First Federal as 
Beneficiary, and from alleged wrongful conduct of the Barber 
Defendants in acquiring the beneficial interest of First Federal 
in said Trust Deed prior to the Trustee's foreclosure sale thereof 
and in completing the Trustee's foreclosure sale of and under said 
Trust Deed. The case was pending in the District Court for over 
five (5) years and during this time proceeded through a number of 
actions by the parties that will be chronicled under the "Statement 
of Facts" Section of this Brief. After the case had been pending 
for five (5) years, the First Federal Defendants, on November 25, 
1988, moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint under Rule 41(b) URCP 
for failure to prosecute. This Motion was joined in by the Barber 
Defendants and was resisted by Plaintiffs who, in response to said 
Motion, concurrently filed (1) a Notice of Objection to Motion to 
Dismiss, (2) a Notice of Readiness For Trial, and (3) a Memorandum 
Opposing Motion to Dismiss and Request For Hearing. 
While said Motion to Dismiss was under consideration by Judge 
Christoffersen, the Clerk of the Court placed the case on the trial 
calendar. Without hearing, the Trial Court, in a Memorandum 
Decision dated January 19, 1989, granted the Motion to Dismiss. 
On January 27, 1989, the Trial Court signed Findings of Fact and 
an Order of Dismissal and therein struck the trial setting made by 
the Clerk of the Court on February 6, 1989. Plaintiffs made a 
Motion For a New Trial, which the Trial Court denied in a 
Memorandum Decision dated February 27, 1989, followed by a formal 
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Order Denying Motion signed March 14, 1989. This appeal by 
Plaintiffs from the Order granting the Motion to Dismiss and Order 
Denying a New Trial followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The procedural chronology of this case as shown from the 
Clerk's file and as found by the Trial Court in its Findings of 
Fact undergirding its Order Dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint is as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed November 3, 1983 (R-l) and 
a Temporary Restraining Order was issued the same day to restrain 
the First Federal Defendants from proceeding with a Trustee's sale 
of Plaintiffs' property (R-ll). 
2. The Trustee's sale scheduled November 3, 1983 was 
postponed one (1) day to November 4, 1983, and on November 4, 1983, 
a hearing was held before the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen on 
Plaintiffs' Temporary Restraining Order. As a result of the 
hearing on November 4, 1983, the Court dismissed its Temporary 
Restraining Order of November 3, 1983 (R-10 and 12), and the 
Trustee's sale as rescheduled was conducted the same day. 
3. On November 7, 1983, the First Federal Defendants filed 
an Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint (R-14). 
4. On November 28, 1983# Plaintiffs filed an Amended 
Complaint (R-16). 
5. On December 8, 1983, the First Federal Defendants filed 
an Answer to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (R-44), and on December 
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15, 1983 the Barber Defendants filed their Answer to Plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint (R-47). 
6. On February 3, 1984, the First Federal Defendants filed 
a Motion For Partial Summary Judgment (R-55) which the Court denied 
in a Memorandum Decision dated March 19, 1984 (R-129). 
7. On March 21, 1984, the First Federal Defendants filed a 
Notice of Readiness For Trial (R-131). Plaintiffs objected to the 
Notice on April 2, 1984, stating in their objection, "Plaintiffs 
intend to prepare and complete discovery both with interrogatories 
and depositions." (R-133) 
8. On July 6, 1984, the First Federal Defendants filed a 
Second Notice of Readiness For Trial (R-137), to which Plaintiffs 
objected on July 11, 1984, stating "... plaintiffs are proceeding 
with discovery." (R-146) 
9. On July 11, 1984, Plaintiffs served Interrogatories and 
a Request For Admissions on Defendants Chadaz and Bearnson (R-139), 
to which Bearnson filed Answers on July 18, 1984 (R-148) and to 
which Chadaz filed Answers on August 10, 1984 (R-152). 
10. On January 13, 1986, the Court, on its own motion, issued 
an Order returnable January 27, 1986 for Plaintiffs to show cause 
why their Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute the same (R-157). 
11. On January 23, 1986, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the 
Court's Order To Show Cause and in their Motion stated, "Plaintiffs 
intend to bring this matter to trial after their evidence has been 
completed. The appraiser has not completed the work he indicated 
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would be done some time ago and Plaintiffs are reminding him of the 
commitment to complete the work." (R-159) The case was not 
dismissed. 
12. On January 27, 1987, the Court, on its own motion, issued 
a second Order, returnable February 9, 1987, for Plaintiffs to show 
cause why their Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute the same (R-160). 
13. On February 5, 1987, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the 
Court's second Order To Show Cause, and in their motion stated, 
"Plaintiffs have not left this case unpursued, but have been 
preparing to go forward with it. ... They desire that this matter 
eventually be set for trial, and anticipate being ready to file a 
request within the year." (R-161) On February 7, 1987, the Order 
To Show Cause was dismissed (R-170). 
14. On February 6, 1987, Plaintiffs served a "First Request 
For Admissions, First Set of Interrogatories and For Production of 
Documents" on the Barber Defendants (R-162). These discovery 
requests were answered by the Barber Defendants on March 11, 1987 
(R-175). 
15. On September 4, 1987, the Barber Defendants moved the 
Court for partial summary judgment (R-188), which motion was denied 
by the Court's Memorandum Decision dated October 6, 1987 (R-215) 
and Order dated October 26, 1987 (R-216). 
16. On November 25, 1987, Plaintiffs served a "First Request 
For Admissions and Interrogatories" on the First Federal Defendants 
(R-218). Defendant Bearnson answered said Request and 
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Interrogatories on December 27, 1987 (R-223). Defendants Hunsaker 
and First Federal answered the Request and Interrogatories on 
December 23, 1987 (R-227), and Defendant Chadaz answered the 
Request and Interrogatories on December 23, 1987 (R-231). 
17. On December 29, 1987, Plaintiffs propounded a Request For 
Production of Documents to the Barber Defendants (R-235), and these 
Requests were responded to by the Barber Defendants on January 4, 
1988 (R-238). 
18. No action was taken by Plaintiffs on the claim from 
December 23, 1987 until after November 25, 1988, when the First 
Federal Defendants filed their Rule 41(b) Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to prosecute. 
Based upon the foregoing status of the record, the First 
Federal Defendants made a Motion on November 25, 1988 pursuant to 
Rule 41(b) URCP to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to 
prosecute the same (R-241). The Motion was accompanied and 
supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities (R-243). On 
December 1, 1988, the Barber Defendants joined in said Motion (R-
255). On December 6, 1988, Plaintiffs filed a "Notice of Objection 
to Motion to Dismiss" (R-257). Then on December 8, 1988, 
Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Readiness for Trial (R-259) and 
written "Objections and Memorandum Opposing Motion to Dismiss and 
Request for Hearing" (R-261). In their Memorandum, the Plaintiffs 
argued their resistance to said Motion on the merits and cited to 
the Court the same cases in support of their opposition to the 
Motion that they now cite to this Court in their Appellants' Brief. 
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The First Federal Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum on 
December 30, 1988 (R-265). On December 2] , 1 988, while the Motion 
of the First Federal Defendants was pending and before a decision 
thereon had been made by the Tri al Cour t ; the Clerk set the case 
for trial (R-268). On December 30, 1988, the Barber Defendants 
filed their Reply Memorandum (R-270). 
On January" 19, 1 989, J udge Christoffersen Issued a Memorandum 
Decision, noting the Plaintiffs' delay and concluding, "Even their 
(Plaintiffs') responses do not produce logical reasons for failing 
to proceed with the prosecution of their claim" and ruling, 
"Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted, ..." (R-273). 
Formal Findinqs of Fact and Order were presented to the Court, 
objected to by Plaintiffs and signed by the Court over Plaintiffs' 
objection on January 27, 1989 (R-286). 
Plaintiffs made a Motion for a New Tri al on February 6, 1 989 , 
which the Court denied in a Memorandum Decision on February 27, 
1989 (R-304) and an "Order Denying New Trial" dated March 14, 1989 
(R-305). This appeal followed the denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
a New Trial (R-307). 
SUMMARY OF ARGDMENTS 
The decision of the Trial Court to dismiss Plaintiffs' 
Complaint: for failure to prosecute is discretionary wi th the Trial 
Court. This Court will not reverse the decision of the Trial Court 
unless the Trial Court has abused this discretion. In this case, 
Plaintiffs have made no showing that the Trial Court abused its 
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discretion, but rather the Defendants have shown ample evidence to 
justify the Trial Court's Order of Dismissal. The dismissal by the 
Trial Court did not violate Plaintiffs' rights to due process or 
access to the courts for a remedy for an alleged wrong to them. 
A concomitant to Plaintiffs' right of due process and access to the 
court is the state's right to control its calendar. This is an 
inherent right of the Court as well as a right granted by Rule 
41(b) URCP. Plaintiffs were given reasonable opportunity to have 
this case heard and forfeited that right by their own inaction, 
delay and failure to prosecute their claims. 
The failure of the Trial Court to grant Plaintiffs a hearing 
on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was not reversible error where 
Plaintiffs have provided not one fact, argument, case or piece of 
evidence which was not already before the Court prior to entry of 
the Order of Dismissal. Plaintiffs have shown no prejudice to them 
at all resulting from the Trial Court's failure to grant the 
requested hearing. 
If this Court finds the Trial Court's failure to grant 
Plaintiffs' hearing was reversible error, the remedy should be to 
remand the case to the Trial Court for a hearing on Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' 
COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE? 
Rule 41(b) URCP provides in parts 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute ... a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or any claim against him ... 
The question of whether a plaintiff has failed to prosecute 
an action lies within the discretion of the Trial Court. In the 
case o£ Charlie Brown Construction Co. Inc. v. Leisure Sports 
Incorporated, 740 P .2d 1 368 (lit .ah A;pp ] 987), this Court he] d: 
Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision within the 
broad discretion of the trial court. This court will not 
interfere with that decision unless it clearly appears that 
the court has abused its discretion and that there is a 
likelihood an injustice has been wrought. (P.1370) 
In this case, the Plaintiffs offered no reasonable excuse to 
the Trial Court for their delay in prosecuting their case, 
prompting Judge Christoffersen to find in his Memorandum Decision: 
"Even their responses do not produce logical reasons for failing 
to proceed wi th pr osecu tion of thei r cla i m- " (R-273) . Nor have 
Plaintiffs set forth in their Brief to this Court any "logical 
reason for failing to proceed with prosecution of their claim." 
On the other hand UKJ" record contains ample evidence of 
Plaintiffs' delay, inactivity and failure to prosecute. In summary 
form that evidence is: 
1. Defendants filed Notices of Readiness for Trial twice, 
once on March 21, 1984 and again on July 6, 1984 (R-131 and 137). 
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Plaintiffs objected to both of these Notices and never, for a 
period of some fifty-three (53) months until Defendants moved to 
dismiss for failure to prosecute, filed their own Notice of 
Readiness for Trial (R-257). We are left to speculate how much 
longer Plaintiffs would have allowed this case to languish had 
Defendants not moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint when they 
did. 
2. The Trial Court twice, on its own Motion, issued Orders 
to Plaintiffs to show cause why their Complaint should not be 
dismissed (R-157 and 160). In response to the first Order to Show 
Cause dated January 13, 1986, Plaintiffs stated, "Plaintiffs intend 
to bring this matter to trial after their evidence has been 
completed. The appraiser has not completed the work he indicated 
would be done some time ago and plaintiffs are reminding him of the 
commitment to complete the work." (R-159) An entire year then 
passed within which Plaintiffs' only activity was to submit a set 
of Interrogatories and Request For Admissions on the Barber 
Defendants (R-162). The Court then issued its second Order to Show 
Cause on January 27, 1987, to which Plaintiffs replied, "Plaintiffs 
have not left this case unpursued but have been preparing to go 
forward with it . . . They desire that this matter eventually be set 
for trial, and anticipate being ready to file a request within the 
year." (R-161) The Plaintiffs made no affidavit and gave no 
statement as to what they were doing to prepare nor did they file 
a Notice of Readiness within the year. 
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3. Each action taken by Plaintiffs during the entire history 
of this case followed some affirmative action by Defendants or the 
Court. Plaintiffs' first discovery efforts occurred on July 11, 
1984 (R-152), five (5) days after Defendants filed a Notice of 
Readiness for Trial (R-146) and eight (8) months after Plaintiffs 
filed their Complaint. Plaintiffs' second discovery effort 
occurred on Fubruciiy (1» 1.98/ (R-175), ten (10) days alter the Court 
ordered Plaintiffs to show cause why their Complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to prosecute (R-160). Plaintiffs' third 
discovery effort occurred on November 25, 1987 (R-218), twenty-nine 
(29) days after the Court denied the Barber Defendants' Motion for 
Partia 1 Summai y Judgmei i !: (R-216) . Plai nti f f s ' fourth di scovery 
effort occurred on December 29, 1987 (R-235), two (2) months and 
three (3) days after the Court's denial of the Barber Defendants' 
Motion, for Pa i: ti a ] Summary J udgment. Had Defendants or the Court 
not prodded Plaintiffs, they may never have taken even the minimal 
affirmative action they did. 
4. In the period from commencement of the case on November 
3, 1983 until the Motion of the First Federal Defendants to dismiss 
on November 25
 r 19 88 ( a per iod i n excess of f i.ve ( 5 ) years) r 
Plaintiffs' sole affirmative acts consisted of filing an Amended 
Complaint and four (4) discovery requests. Each discovery request 
was promptly and t imely -responded to by Defendants. Five (5) 
actions in fi we (5) years indicates a very casual and dilatory 
approach by Plaintiffs to the prosecution of their claim. 
Absolutely nothing happened so far as Plaintiffs pursuing their 
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claims between their last discovery request on December 29, 1987 
and their Notice of Readiness for Trial on December 8, 1988. 
Again, never once before the Trial Court or this Court have 
Plaintiffs given any explanation for their sporadic attention to 
this case. 
5. In the five (5) years this case was pending in the Trial 
Court, the Plaintiffs resisted Defendants' efforts to bring the 
case to trial (see paragraph 2 above) and never once, until the 
First Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, did Plaintiffs attempt 
to even have a trial date set. 
The foregoing five (5) points show clearly that the Court had 
ample basis for dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint and that in doing 
so the Court did not abuse its discretion. 
Rule 41(b) URCP has been applied by this Court on several 
occasions. In Brasher Motor and Finance Company v. Richard A. 
Brown, 461 P.2d 464 (Utah 1969), the Court affirmed dismissal of 
a counterclaim that had been pending for 5-1/2 years. The Court 
made the following pertinent observation: 
In our opinion, the trial court in urging a plague 
on both of the litigants' houses by its sua sponte 
action, made a gesture that, if employed by more judges, 
could aid in the elimination of backlogs, and help to 
restore that loss of public confidence in the judiciary 
engendered thereby. (P. 464) 
In Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975), the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a medical malpractice 
action which had been pending for just two (2) years when the 
plaintiff had been dilatory in responding to defendant's discovery 
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efforts and had resisted defendant's efforts to get the case to 
trial. 
In the recent case of Charlie Brown, supra, the Utah Court of 
Appe a 1 s a £ f 1 rmed d i smi s s a 1 o f t he p 1 a I n 11, f f ' s c omp 1 a i n t on t he 
following set of facts: 
3. Plaintiff's Complaint was filed June 15, 1981. 
2. Ten and one-half months later on May 27, 1982, 
plaintiffs moved to amend their Complaint and noticed up 
depositions. The depositions were postponed until July 
9, 1982, 
3. On July 9 and 16, 1982, defendants filed for a 
protective order. 
4. Nine months later, on April 4, 1983, plaintiffs 
filed Interrogatories. 
5. On December 5, 1983, after eight more months of 
inactivity, the Court sua sponte issued an Order to Show 
Cause returnable March 19, 1984 which was continued to 
April 16, 1984. The Order to Show Cause was again 
continued for sixty days. 
6. On April 30, 1984, the Court sua sponte set the 
case for trial June 18, 1984. When no one appeared for 
trial on June 18, 1984, the Court dismissed the case wi th 
prejudice on the merits. 
The Charlie Brown, supra, case had been pending for three (3) 
years when it was dismissed. The Court addressed the plaintiff's 
argument tha t the d ismissaJ was art abuse of the Cour t:' s d i scretion 
and stated: 
Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision within 
the broad discretion of the trial court. This court will 
not interfere with that decision unless it clearly 
appears that the court has abused its discretion and that 
there is a likelihood an injustice has been wrought. 
(P. 1370) 
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In affirming the dismissal, the Court quoted with approval the 
following language from Lake Meredith Reservoir Co. v. Amity Mutual 
Irrigation Co. . 698 P.2d 1340 (Colo. 1985), "The burden is upon the 
plaintiff to prosecute a case in due course without unusual or 
unreasonable delay". The Court also quoted with approval the 
language from the Maxfield case, supra, that Plaintiffs are 
required "to prosecute their claims with due diligence, or accept 
the penalty of dismissal." (Maxfield at p. 1325^ 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Charlie Brown also addressed the 
propriety of the trial court's dismissal "with prejudice". The 
Court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice and stated: 
In the instant case, the trial court provided plaintiffs 
an opportunity to be heard and to do justice. Plaintiffs 
nevertheless abused their opportunity through dilatory 
conduct. We therefore find no abuse of discretion and 
affirm the trial court's order ... (P. 1371) 
Perhaps if Plaintiffs had presented any reason or justifiable 
basis for sixty (60) months of delay and inaction, their claims 
could be viewed more favorably, but a review of Plaintiffs' Motion 
For New Trial and Memorandum and Objection to Findings and Order 
of Dismissal shows no reason for such delay and inaction. There 
are no reasons given in Plaintiffs' Brief. The only suggested 
reason for Plaintiffs' actions and delays are in counsel's 
Affidavit dated February 6, 1989 (R-295): 
Plaintiffs have moved forward with the case as quickly 
as their schedule and counsel's schedules would allow, 
in view of the limited discovery responses and the 
totality of events needing their attention. 
(Paragraph 3) 
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Defendants submit that Defendants should not be penalized 
because Plaintiffs and their counsel are, i n essence, "too busy". 
Plaintiffs do not claim that there are ongoing negotiations causing 
delay, that someone? is ill or unavailable, that the case is complex 
or difficult—just that Plaintiffs and their counsel have bus]/ 
"schedules" and a "totality of events needing their attention". 
Defendants submit these facts dire not: reasons, but excuses, and 
support the Trial Court's Dismissal. 
Plaintiffs contend that dismissal of their case is a denial 
of due process under the United States arid Utah State Const,, i tutions 
and prohibits them from having their constitutional right to a 
remedy in due> course mf" law (See p. vii of Plaintiffs' Brief.) 
Plaintiffs cite not one case or statute suggesting that substantive 
or procedural due process has ever been applied in the manner they 
suggest. 
Admittedly, Plaintiffs had a right to the trial of their case, 
but the state at the same time has the right to place reasonable 
limitations on those rights and to cut those rights off when those 
reasonable limitations have been exceeded. In this case, the Court 
• lid ii«")t den> Plaintiffs their right to a trial, Plaintiffs denied 
themselves that right by their conduct in failing to pursue their 
right in an active and meaningful way over a period of more than 
five (5) years, Plai ntiffs have not cited to this Court any case 
holding that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is denial 
of due process of law or of access to the Courts. 
17 
Due process of law has two (2) aspects. The first is 
procedural due process which is a rule that "... no one shall be 
personally barred until he has had his day in court, by which is 
meant until he has been duly cited to appear and has been afforded 
the opportunity to be heard." (16A Am.Jur.2d on "Constitutional 
Law", §813 p. 968) 
The second aspect is substantive due process or the 
"... guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his life, 
liberty, or property for arbitrary reasons . . . •• (16A Am.Jur.2d on 
"Constitutional Law", §816, p. 978) 
In this case, Plaintiffs have not been denied either 
procedural or substantive due process, nor were they unreasonably 
deprived of access to the Court. Plaintiffs were afforded the 
right to be heard and have their case brought to trial. That right 
extended for over five (5) years. During this time they did 
nothing of substance to prosecutes their claims. They were dilatory 
in the extreme, and such action as they took was in response to 
pressure from the Defendants and the Court. The right and 
opportunity to be heard was not taken from Plaintiffs by dismissal 
of this action, it was forfeited by Plaintiffs by reason of their 
extended inactivity. 
Nor have Plaintiffs been denied substantive due process. 
Their Complaint was not dismissed for arbitrary reasons. Indeed, 
as shown by the Court file, there was protracted delay by 
Plaintiffs even after Defendants had twice requested a trial and 
after the Trial Court had twice ordered Plaintiffs to show cause 
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why their case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
The action of the Trial Court was not arbitrary but was based on 
a solid record compiled by Plaintiffs justifying dismissal of the 
case. 
Plaintiffs make no claim that they did not have an adequate 
time to prepare a meaningful response to Defendants' Motion; there 
is no claim by the Plaintiffs that they did not have a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard through the written documents which they 
filed with the Court on at least three (3) occasions, that being 
the response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Objection to 
Defendants' proposed Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal, and 
Plaintiffs' Motion For a New Trial and supporting documentation to 
each of the foregoing. There is no evidence that there was any 
limitation placed upon the Plaintiffs as to that written 
documentation which they could submit to the Court. There is no 
evidence that Plaintiffs did not have every opportunity to present 
every available defense or consideration in favor of their 
position, and there is no evidence, other than some bare 
allegations and innuendo without any supporting facts whatsoever, 
that Plaintiffs' position did not receive a complete, fair and 
impartial consideration by the Trial Court. 
In the exercise of its discretion, the Trial Court acted by 
authority of Rule 41(b) URCP. It is held that even independent of 
Rule or statute, the Court has inherent power to dismiss a case. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in the case of Hansen v. Firebaugh, 392 
P.2d 202 (Idaho 1964), held: 
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It must be conceded that by the great weight of authority the 
power of courts to dismiss a case because of a failure to 
prosecute with due diligence is inherent and independent of 
any statute or rule of court. (P. 203) 
And the Utah Supreme Court in Charlie Brown, supra, quoted 
with approval the following language from Brasher Motor, supra: 
In dismissing an action for want of prosecution, the 
court may proceed under [Rule 41(b)], or it may, of its 
own motion, take action to that end, (P. 1370) 
This power is deemed to be necessarily vested in trial courts 
to manage their own affairs so as to achieve orderly and 
expeditious disposition of cases. (24 Am.Jur.2d on "Dismissal", 
§48, p. 38) The Trial Court acted prudently, fairly and within 
its discretion in dismissing the action. 
II. 
WAS THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS A HEARING ON THE 
MOTION OF THE FIRST FEDERAL DEFENDANTS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO 
PROSECUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR? 
Plaintiffs cite Rule 4-501(9) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, which provides that where the granting of a motion 
would dispose of the action on the merits with prejudice, the party 
resisting the motion may request a hearing and such request shall 
be granted. Plaintiffs made such a request, but the Trial Court 
ruled upon the Motion to Dismiss without a hearing. Plaintiffs 
contend this is reversible error. 
The Plaintiffs have not shown by affidavit or argument before 
either the Trial Court or this Court how they have been prejudiced 
by the failure of the Trial Court to give them a hearing on 
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Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Simultaneous with their request 
for a hearing, the Plaintiffs also filed a Memorandum opposing the 
Motion. The Court had this written Memorandum before it when it 
made its decision to dismiss Plaintiffs' case. Plaintiffs did not 
in their Memorandum offer any reason for their delay in prosecuting 
their case or any evidence they could or proposed to present at a 
hearing to justify their delay. The Trial Court concluded in its 
Memorandum Decision: "Even their (Plaintiffs') responses do not 
produce logical reasons for failing to proceed with prosecution of 
their claims." 
After the Memorandum Decision, when Plaintiffs knew their case 
had been dismissed and they asked for a new trial, they did not 
come forth with any affidavits or reasons for their delay in 
prosecuting their case. They simply said they should have a 
hearing. Though they wrote Memoranda to the Court, both in 
opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and in support of their Motions 
for a New Trial, they did not, in either case, show that they had 
any matters to present at a hearing that they had not presented in 
their Memoranda. 
In response to Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial, the Court 
held in its Memorandum Decision of February 27, 1989, "Plaintiffs 
have, in their motion (for a new trial) used the same arguments 
that were used on the prior motion." (R-304) 
And in their Brief to this Court, Plaintiffs have failed to 
state any reason for their delay in prosecuting the case. Their 
Brief is devoted to showing why their case should not have been 
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dismissed on the law and the facts, but they have said nothing 
about what reasons they could have presented for their delay had 
they been given a hearing. 
In short, from all arguments Plaintiffs have made to this 
Court and the Trial Court, there is nothing to show that they have 
been prejudiced by not having a hearing. All of their facts and 
legal arguments were considered by the Trial Court. If there were 
matters dehors the record that the Trial Court should have 
considered, they were never offered to the Trial Court either in 
opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or in support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion For a New Trial, nor have they been offered to 
this Court. The record gives ample justification for the Court's 
Order of Dismissal. A hearing would not have changed the record 
from which the Court made its decision. 
Even if the failure to grant Plaintiffs a hearing is deemed 
by this Court to be reversible error, then the remedy should be to 
remand the case to the Trial Court for a hearing on Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs contend the case should be remanded 
for trial. Such an action would eviscerate the purpose of Rule 
4-501(9) of the Code of Judicial Administration, which is to give 
a person a hearing on a motion which would, if granted, dispose of 
his case on the merits. The only right Plaintiffs were deprived 
of was a right to a hearing, and this Court can remedy that wrong 
by remanding the case for a hearing on Plaintiffs' Objection to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. This Court should not go beyond the 
action necessary to remedy the Trial Court's error, if any. 
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Plaintiffs made a request for attorney's fees and costs under 
Rules 33 and 34 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. It is 
clear that Rule 33 is designed to deal with circumstances in which 
appeals are taken for the purpose of delay or without any 
substantial merit. It is not designed to protect the Appellant, 
inasmuch as it is the Appellant who makes the determination to make 
the appeal. As the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "We recognize 
the sanctions for frivolous appeals should only be applied in 
egregious cases, lest there be an improper showing of the right to 
appeal erroneous lower court decisions." Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 
365, 369 (Utah App. 1988). There is no basis in the case before 
the Court to assess attorney's fees against the Defendants under 
Rules 33 or 34 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, and 
Plaintiffs argue no basis for assessment of the same. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear under the facts of this case that the Trial Court 
did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint 
for failure to prosecute. Rather, the action of the Trial Court 
in dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to prosecute is 
amply justified by the facts. The law of this state, both by Rule 
and the decision of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court, permit 
and give precedence for the dismissal. The Plaintiffs have not 
been deprived of a right by any arbitrary action of the Trial Court 
or without an opportunity to press and present their claim. 
Rather, their right to assert their claim has been dismissed by 
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reason of their own neglect and inaction. Finally, the Plaintiffs 
have shown no prejudice to them resulting from failure of the Trial 
Court to grant them a hearing on their Objection to Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence or 
argument to the Court justifying their delay. There is nothing to 
be gained by a hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss beyond what 
has already been presented to the Trial Court or this Court. 
Plaintiffs have not presented one fact, case, argument or piece of 
evidence that they claim needs additional consideration by the 
Trial Court in order to render a fair and correct decision. For 
these reasons, the judgment of the Trial Court should be affirmed. 
If, however, this Court determines that a hearing should have been 
granted to Plaintiffs and the failure is reversible error, this 
Court's decision should be to remand the case to the Trial Court 
for the purpose of such a hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
DATED this 28th day of July, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
/^J^JU/: 
*L. Brent Hoggan 
Attorneys for De4Teffdant First 
Federal, Hunsaker, Chadaz and 
Bearnson 
HAND-CARRY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered ja^t exact copy of the 
foregoing Brief of the Respondents First Federal Savings & Loan 
Association of Logan, Fred Hunsaker and Brian Chadaz, as Officers 
and as Individuals, and Brad H. Bearnson, Trustee, to Plaintiffs' 
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Attorney, Raymond N. Malouf, at 250 East 200 North, Suite D, Logan, 
Utah 84321 and to N. George Daines, Attorney for Defendants Norman 
Barber, Helen Barber and N. George Daines, at 108 North Main, Suite 
201, Logan, Utah 84321, this 28th day of July, 1989-
^ ^ y ^ ^ *%h? 
L. Brent Hogg, 
lbh/2 
stocking.bri 
N-55.89aF 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA 
H. STOCKING, husband and 
wife, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS and 
LOAN ASSOCIATION of Logan, 
et al, 
Defendants 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 22183 
Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss on the basis of 
Plaintiff's failing to prosecute their claim in a timely manner. 
It was filed November 3, 1982 and a temporary order issued. 
Plaintiff's Temporary Order was dismissed and a trustee sale 
re-scheduled and conducted the same day. On October 28, 198 3, 
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint to which an answer was filed. 
Defendant filed a Motion for Notice of Readiness for Trial for 
March 21, 1984. Plaintiff has objected to these Notices of 
Readiness they have been delaying this for some six years now. It 
seems that it could have proceeded in a much more timely fashion. 
Even their responses do not produce logical reasons for failing 
to proceed with the prosecution of their claim. 
Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted, and 
counsel for Defendants to prepare the appropriate order. 
p Dated this )^ day of January, 19 89. 
\L LCULm j j ^ . >t ,U4^ f^ / / / / 
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L. Brent Hoggan (#1512) 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
Attorneys at Law 
56 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321-0525 
Telephone: 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H. 
STOCKING, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, FRED 
HUNSAKER and BRIAN CHADAZ as 
officers and as individuals; 
BRAD H. BEARNSON, Trustee; 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
successor beneficiaries; 
N. GEORGE DAINES, and JOHN 
DOES 1-8, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 22183 
In this matter Defendants First Federal Savings & Loan 
Association of Logan, Fred Hunsaker, Brian Chadaz and Brad H. 
Bearnson, filed a Motion pursuant to Rule 41(b) to dismiss 
Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute the 
same and therewith filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of said Motion, and Defendants Norman Barber, Helen 
Barber, and N. George Daines joined in said Motion in writing. 
Plaintiffs objected to said Motion and filed their objection with 
a Memorandum in support thereof in writing. The Court having read 
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and considered said Motions and the Memoranda in support and 
opposition thereto, having examined the file, and on January 19, 
1989 having made its Memorandum Decision in writing, now makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
From the record in the file on this matter, the Court finds: 
1. Plaintiffs1 Complaint was filed November 3, 1982 and a 
Temporary Restraining Order was issued the same day to restrain 
Defendants First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan, Fred 
Hunsaker, Brian Chadaz and Brad H. Bearnson from proceeding with a 
Trustee's sale of Plaintiffs' property. 
2. The Trustee's sale scheduled November 3, 1983 was 
postponed one (1) day to November 4, 1983, and on November 4, 
1983, a hearing was held before the Honorable VeNoy Chris toffersen 
on Plaintiffs' Temporary Restraining Order. As a result of the 
hearing, Plaintiffs' Temporary Restraining Order was dismissed on 
November 4, 1983, and the Trustee's sale as rescheduled was 
conducted the same day. 
3. On November 7, 1983, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker, 
Chadaz and Bearnson filed an Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
4. On November 28, 1983, Plaintiffs filed an Amended 
Complaint. 
5. On December 8, 1983, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker, 
Chadaz and Bearnson filed an Answer to Plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint. 
6. On February 3, 1984, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker, 
Chadaz and Bearnson filed a Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, 
which was denied by the Court in a Memorandum Decision dated March 
19, 1984. 
7. On March 21, 1984, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker, 
Chadaz and Bearnson filed a Notice of Readiness for Trial. 
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Plaintiffs objected to the Notice on April 2, 1984, stating in 
their objection, "Plaintiffs intend to prepare and complete 
discovery both with interrogatories and depositions.11 
8. On July 6, 1984, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker, 
Chadaz and Bearnson filed a Second Notice of Readiness for Trial, 
to which Plaintiffs objected stating, "... plaintiffs are 
proceeding with discovery/' 
9. On July 11, 1984, Plaintiffs served Interrogatories and a 
Request For Admission on Defendants Chadaz and Bearnson, to which 
Bearnson filed Answers on July 18, 1984 and Chadaz filed Answers 
on August 10, 1984. 
10. On January 13, 1986, the Court, on its own motion, 
issued an Order returnable January 27, 1986 for Plaintiffs to show 
cause why their Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute the same. 
11. On January 23, 1986, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the 
Court's Order to Show Cause and in their Motion stated, "Plain-
tiffs intend to bring this matter to trial after their evidence 
has been completed. The appraiser has not completed the work he 
indicated would be done sometime ago and Plaintiffs are reminding 
him of the commitment to complete the work." 
12. On January 27, 1987, the Court, on its own motion, 
issued an Order, returnable February 9, L987, for Plaintiffs to 
show cause why their Complaint should not be dismissed for failure 
to prosecute the same. 
13. On February 5, 1987, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the 
Court's Order to Show Cause, and in their motion stated, "Plain-
ftHOGGAN tiffs have not left this case unpursued, but have been preparing 
EVSATUAW
 tQ forward with it. ... They desire that this matter eventually 
;T CENTER ° J J 
KDX525 b e s e t for t r ial , and anticipate being ready to file a request 
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14. On February 6, 1987, Plaintiffs served a "First Set of 
Request For Admissions, First Set of Interrogatories and For 
Production of Documents" on Defendants Barber. These discovery 
requests were answered by Defendants Barber on March 11, 1987. 
15. On September 4, 1987, Defendants Barber moved the Court 
for partial summary judgment, which motion was denied by the 
Court's Memorandum Decision dated October 6, 1987. 
16. On November 25, 1987, Plaintiffs served a "First Set of 
Interrogatories11 on Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker, Chadaz and 
Bearnson. Defendants First Federal and Hunsaker answered the 
Interrogatories on December 23, 1987; Defendant Bearnson answered 
the Interrogatories on December 22, 1987, and Defendant Chadaz 
answered the Interrogatories on December 23, 1987. 
17. No action has been taken by Plaintiffs on their claim 
since December 23, 1987. 
18. Based upon the foregoing Findings from the record in the 
file, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to prosecute 
their claims in this case in due course and without unreasonable 
delay. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
concludes that Plaintiffs1 Complaint and all claims therein should 
be dismissed with prejudice. 
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that 
Plaintiffs' Complaint and all claims therein as against all 
Defendants be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
It is further ORDERED that the trial date for this case* of 
April 11, 1989 as a second setting and May 23, 1989 as a first 
setting be and are stricken. 
DATED this , ^ day of January, 1989. 
<oy~ U,h"c¥sXott&tsen 
DistMfct Judge / 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that an exact copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Order of Dismissal With Prejudice was served upon Plain-
tiffs' counsel, Raymond N. Malouf, personally by delivering a copy 
to his office at 150 East 200 North in Logan, Utah this 20th 
day of January, 1989, and that an exact copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal With Prejudice was served 
upon N. George Daines, III, Attorney for Defendants Barber, 
personally by delivering a copy to his office at 108 North Main, 
Suite 200, Logan, Utah, this 20th day of January, 1989. 
'iffany Parlor ; 
\'M 
Tirr
Secretary to L. Brent Hoggan 
"i 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
VON K. STOCKING and 
DONNA H. STOCKING, husband 
and wife, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS and 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al 
Defendants 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 22183 
Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for a New Trial. There 
was no trial in this case, the issue was put to the Court on a 
Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute and decided by the 
Court from the record on that basis. Plaintiffs have, in their 
motion, used the same arguments that were used on the prior motion. 
Therefore, the Motion for a NewJTrial is denied and 
counsel for defendants to prepare the appropriate order. 
Dated this - )^ 1 day of February, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ 
/ 
VeNoy "Ch'rlsteffersek 
District Judge 
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L. Brent Hoggan (#1512) 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
Attorneys at Law 
56 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H. 
STOCKING, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, FRED 
HUNSAKER AND BRIAN CHADAZ, as 
officers and as individuals, 
BRAD H. BEARNSON, Trustee; 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
successor beneficiaries; N. 
GEORGE DAINES, and JOHN DOES 1-8, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING NEW TRIAL 
S3co 
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In this matter the Court having made and entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree on January 
27, 1989 dismissing Plaintiffs1 Complaint and all claims therein 
with prejudice and Plaintiffs having thereafter filed with this 
Court a Motion For New Trial and in support thereof having filed a 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Defendants having filed 
responsive Memorandum to said Motion For New Trial and the Plain-
tiff a rebuttal to Defendants1 response, and the Court having 
examined the Motion of Plaintiffs and the Memoranda of the parties 
for and against the same, now finds that the arguments of Plain-
tiffs in support of their Motion For New Trial were the same 
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arguments submitted by Plaintiffs in their opposition to 
Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint and that there 
are no new matters or arguments raised by Plaintiffs in said 
Motion For New Trial and the Court on February 27, 1989 having 
made and entered its Memorandum Decision, and the Court being 
fully adivsed in the premises, it is now 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Plaintiffs1 Motion For New 
Trial be and the same is hereby denied. 
DATED this l4 day of March, 1989. 
Dis t r i c t 
4 & H O G G A N 
'NEVS AT LAW 
EST CENTER 
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CERTIFICATE OF PERSONAL SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I personally served an exact copy of 
the foregoing Order Denying New Trial upon N. George Daines, 
Attorney for himself and Defendants Barber, and upon Raymond N. 
Malouf, Attorney for Plaintiffs, by delivering a copy to each at 
their law offices in Logan, Utah, this 1st day of March, 1989. 
Tiffany Parker 
Secretary to L. Brent Hoggan 
LBH/38 
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